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We address the problem of associating access policies with datasets and how to monitor compliance via
policy-carrying data. Our contributions are a formal model in first-order logic inspired by normative multi-
agent systems to regulate data access, and a computational model for the validation of specific use cases and
the verification of policies against criteria. Existing work on access policy identifies roles as a key enabler,
with which we concur, but much of the rest focusses on authentication and authorization technology. Our
proposal aims to address the normative principles put forward in Berners-Lee’s bill of rights for the internet,
through human-readable but machine-processable access control policies.
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1. INTRODUCTION1
Recent data-intensive research trends such as the Internet-of-Things (IoT) and Big2
Data, combined with socio-technical systems (STS) such as social networking and sup-3
ported by portable devices (with sensors, GPS, etc.) make companies, research centres,4
and all of us, as individuals, both producers and consumers of data. A sensitive issue5
for data providers concerns control over access, sharing, dissemination and use of data.6
We regard control as placing restrictions on who can access the data, when data can be7
accessed, how data can be accessed, and so on. Although Berners-Lee does not provide8
a shopping-list of features in [Berners-Lee 1999, Ch.11], he sets out similar informal9
(and abstract) normative aims, stating:10
The Platform for Privacy Preferences Project (P3P) will give a computer11
a way of describing its owner’s privacy preferences and demands, while it12
gives servers a way of describing their privacy policies, all implemented so13
that machines can understand each other and negotiate any differences.14
P3P activity suspended in 2007, shortly after the publication of version 1.1 of the plat-15
form specification [P3P 2006], citing a lack of support from browser developers. The16
aim at the time appears to have been to support privacy in the context of consumer-17
to-business (purchasing) transactions via browser (consumer) and web-site (business).18
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What may have seemed significant at the time, appears with hindsight to have a rela-19
tively narrow technological and use-case basis – to which [P3P 2006] is very specific –20
but equally, with hindsight, the same vision, issues and principles appear to be appli-21
cable in the emerging environments of IoT and STS.22
Consider a scenario in which a health insurance company offers its customers a23
mobile phone app which collects data from a fitness wristband. The data collected24
concern blood pressure, heartbeat, amount of physical exercise and sleeping patterns;25
additionally it would also be possible to collect information on what people eat and26
drink via the app. The insurance company aims to offer better deals to customers who27
lead healthy lifestyles and, conversely, make more adequate provisions for customers28
with sedentary and disease-prone lifestyles. Users of the app, however, should have29
means to decide on the policies governing the data. For instance, even though users30
might agree to provide to the insurance company their heartbeat data (because they31
might get a reduced price when renewing their insurance) they may deny access to32
this data to any for-profit third-party (e.g., a pharmaceutical company).33
The current data landscape supports relative freedom of movement of data from34
individuals to the data silos used in cloud computing and thence between silos; this35
might contribute to the sense of lack of control which data providers might feel over36
their own data, privacy controls aside [Brandimarte et al. 2013]. This is further com-37
plicated as platforms may enable the collection and interpretation of those data, thus38
adding value to them. Our proposal associates data with bespoke policies: for example,39
framework policies might be defined by legislation, while specific policies for individ-40
ual needs would have to satisfy the norms established at the primary level [Li et al.41
2013].42
In this paper we present an approach to represent fine-grained controls over data43
and to associate that inseparably from the data via what we call “policy-carrying data”44
(PCD1). Our PCDs explicitly represent who, when and how, also establishing what45
the consumer should (not) do when accessing data. Our proposal is novel in that we46
can establish permissions, obligations and prohibitions concerning what the consumer47
should (not) do when data are accessed; these permissions, obligations and prohibi-48
tions as well as the interconnections among different PCDs provide a foundation for49
transparency which is essential to a data-sharing economy. Obligations, prohibitions50
and permissions can be seen as transactional units in a non-pecuniary data economy,51
where access to and use of data may be traded for obligations, prohibitions and per-52
missions that act as a form of user-definable, liquidity-at-point-of-use community cur-53
rency [Litaer 2002]. These obligations, permissions and prohibitions may pertain di-54
rectly to actions of data consumers or – and this is another significant novelty of our55
approach – indirectly to the policy associated with the extracted data or the data de-56
rived from them.57
The main contributions of this paper are (i) a formal representation for PCD, with58
practicality concerns, and (ii) a reference implementation of core elements of our pro-59
posal. Additionally, we provide a computational context whereby stakeholders, pro-60
cesses and information model come together to share data via PCD. We build upon61
and extend the research presented in [Padget and Vasconcelos 2015]; however, whereas62
that paper was concerned with a much simpler propositional formalism, we have devel-63
oped a more expressive first-order notation with practical concerns, that is, the mech-64
anisms manipulating the formalisation are decidable and tractable. The implementa-65
tion has not been previously reported.66
1PCD also stands for “policy-carrying data collection” and we use PCDs (in the plural) to indicate a set of
policy-carrying data collections.
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Fig. 1. Stakeholders, Processes & Information Model
We present in Section 2 how we envisage stakeholders and PCDs will come together67
in a computational setting. In Section 3 we present the syntax and (operational) se-68
mantics of our PCDs, and sketch some mechanisms using PCDs. In Section 4 we69
present a reference implementation of our approach. In Section 5 we discuss related70
work and we conclude the paper in Section 6.71
2. POLICY-CARRYING DATA: STAKEHOLDERS, PROCESSES AND INFORMATION MODEL72
We illustrate in Fig. 1 the stakeholders (squares with round edges), their processes (ar-73
rows), and an information model (boxes within central box) associated with our PCDs.74
The stakeholders are (i) data owners/producers who make data/information available75
(represented as the left-hand square); (ii) data consumers who want to access data (rep-76
resented as the right-hand square); (iii) monitor/police who are responsible for moni-77
toring/policing the publication and access activities (represented by the upper square78
in the middle). The first two types of stakeholders can be organisations or individuals79
as well as devices such as sensors, programs, databases, and so on. The monitor/police80
works as a third-party authority ensuring that activities (publishing and accessing)81
follow policies and dealing with violations.82
Each of these stakeholders has their specific ways to interact via the repository:83
(i) publishing (represented by the blue solid arrow) is the process whereby data own-84
ers/producers make their data available but “wrapped” within a policy, that is, they85
publish, in a repository, some policy-carrying data (ii) accessing (represented by the86
red dotted arrow) is the process whereby data consumers attempt to obtain access to87
data mediated via policies (iii) monitoring (represented by the green arrow) concerns88
observing activities and checking for policy compliance or violation, and dispensing89
rewards or sanctions.90
Our proposal relies on an information model (stored within the “repository” rectan-91
gle in the centre of the diagram) comprising the PCD (a policy and an associated data92
collection made available through the policy) and a history (a collection of events, i.e.,93
a record of activities carried out) gathered at particular time points, denoted as the94
states of the repository. This information model supports stakeholders carrying out the95
cycle of publish-access-monitor activities using a Web server equipped with function-96
alities to enable the policing of those accessing and uploading PCDs, keeping records97
of usage and (non-)compliance, and enforcing the policies’ access control. We envisage98
programmatic access to PCDs, whereby programs and functionalities developed with99
specific technologies can access any PCD, interacting via pre-established protocols.100
A typical PCD would express something like “Research staff can access 200 records101
of my data”. If an interested party requested 500 records, the server would (i) check the102
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credentials of the requester (who needs to be registered); (ii) grant access to 200 records103
(a message would provide reasons for not providing the 500 records); (iii) update the104
record of that requester with respect to that PCD. Further requests from research105
staff would be rejected with a suitable justification. For such control to be in place, the106
server requires a record of events: an explicit account of the history of the PCD, how107
they have been used, by whom and when.108
There are obvious similarities between our framework and existing approaches. Ex-109
isting mechanisms to regulate resource access in distributed systems [Anderson 2001]110
have similar provisions as our framework – stakeholders, activities and (parts of) the111
information model – however as we show below, our policy language is more expressive,112
which in its turn, requires a more sophisticated information model allowing for extra113
functionalities to be in place. The language used to express policies clearly plays an114
important role in acceptability, accessibility and functionality. We put forward a model115
language, that is not tied to a concrete and standardised syntax, in Section 3. However,116
there are lessons to take from a wide variety of initiatives across the computer science117
domain as we discuss in Section 3 and more broadly in related work (Section 5).118
3. A LANGUAGE FOR POLICIES-CARRYING DATA119
There has been much research addressing data access policies, dating back from early120
UNIX file systems [Suhendra 2011; Tonti et al. 2003; Ferraiolo et al. 2011]. In our ap-121
proach we include means to refer to a history of events, as in, for instance, “the first122
n users can access my data” and “anyone is permitted to use n records of my data”.123
We provide fine-grained control over who is to access the data, and under what cir-124
cumstances; for instance, “user u2 is forbidden to access my data” and “anyone from125
company x may use my data after 6PM”. We can also capture dynamic aspects of data126
usage, examples being “whoever accesses D1 should not access D2” and “anyone who127
uses my data should provide data”. Although our formalism does not offer logical im-128
plication (to reduce the complexity of associated reasoning mechanisms), we provide129
means to relate data access/provision events via activation and deactivation condi-130
tions, which enables us to represent norms such as “anyone who uses my data should131
provide me with data”.132
We combine, adapt and extend existing proposals on normative (multi-agent) sys-133
tems [Meneguzzi et al. 2015; S¸ensoy et al. 2012; Garcı´a-Camino et al. 2009; Vasconce-134
los et al. 2009], representing data-related events (such as accessing records or publish-135
ing data collections), authorship of events and attempted actions, activation and deac-136
tivation conditions of policies, and the object of the policy, namely, the data collection137
itself. We introduce in the subsections below a language for policies and a represen-138
tation for policy-carrying data, and equip these with a simple operational semantics139
using states and histories.140
3.1. Underpinnings: a Fragment of First-Order Logic141
Our building blocks are first-order predicates pi of the form pni (t1, . . . , tn) where pni is142
a predicate symbol, n is the arity of the predicate symbol (omitted when the context143
makes it clear) and tj , 1 ≤ j ≤ n, are variables (denoted as v, w, x, y, z, possibly with144
subscripts) or constants (denoted as a, b, c, d, possibly with subscripts). We make use of145
two logical operators, namely conjunction ∧ and negation ¬, and define our formulae146
ϕ via the grammar ϕ ::= ϕ ∧ ϕ | pi | ¬pi. We note that in our language negation is147
only applicable to predicates pi, and not to sub-formulae; moreover, negation cannot148
be nested. This means our language is less expressive than first-order logic and, in149
particular, we cannot define other operators such as disjunction ∨ and implication→.150
This restriction in expressiveness enables us to provide computational mechanisms151
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which are decidable (unlike first-order logic) and of practical use, as explained below.152
We refer to all formulae of this fragment of first-order logic as L.153
Typical examples of first-order predicates are access(d1, u1, temperature, 500), which154
intuitively states that the field “temperature” from data collection d1 has been accessed155
by user u1 500 times; and provide(d2, u455, gps, 20), which states that user u455 provided156
20 data items “gps” to data collection d2.157
Since we allow variables to appear in our formulae, we must consider their quan-158
tification. Let vars(pi) = {x0, . . . , xn} be a function to obtain the possibly empty and159
finite set of variables xi, 0 ≤ i ≤ n, in predicate pi; we extend this function to obtain the160
variables of ϕ formulae: vars(ϕ ∧ ϕ′) = vars(ϕ) ∪ vars(ϕ′) and vars(¬pi) = vars(pi). We161
extend our ϕ formulae with the existential quantifier ∃ and the universal quantifier162
∀, and we introduce a vector notation as a shorthand for convenience, ~x def= x0, . . . , xn,163
to refer to all quantified variables in a particular order. Our quantified formulae are164
thus ∃~x.ϕ and ∀~x.ϕ, where vars(ϕ) = {x0, . . . , xn}. This means that all variables of a165
formula are in the scope of one same existential or universal quantifier, which prefixes166
a formula, that is, there is no nesting of quantifiers, and quantifiers must precede a167
formula (a quantifier cannot appear within sub-formulae).168
In order to define our semantics, we make use of a unification operation “·”, associ-169
ating a substitution σ = {x0/t′0, . . . , xm/t′m}, that is, a possibly empty and finite set of170
pairs xi/t′i, 0 ≤ i ≤ m, as follows [Apt 1997; Fitting 1996]:171
(1) c · σ = c, that is, a constant c unified with any substitution is c itself172
(2) x · σ = x, iff x/t′i 6∈ σ, that is, if x is not associated with any t′i in σ, then its173
unification with σ is x itself.174
(3) x · σ = t′i · σ, iff x/t′i ∈ σ, that is, the unification of x with a substitution in which x175
is associated with a term t′i (that is, a variable or a constant) is the unification of t′i176
with σ.177
(4) p(t1, . . . , tn) · σ = p(t1 · σ, . . . , tn · σ), that is, the unification of a predicate with σ is178
the predicate with each of its terms unified with σ.179
(5) (¬pi) · σ = ¬(pi · σ), that is, the unification of a negated predicate pi with σ is the180
negation of the unification of pi with σ.181
(6) (ϕ ∧ ϕ′) · σ = (ϕ · σ ∧ ϕ′ · σ), that is, the unification of a conjunction (ϕ ∧ ϕ′) with σ182
is the conjunction of the unification (ϕ · σ ∧ ϕ′ · σ).183
Substitutions can be composed, that is, given σ = {x1/t1, . . . , xn/tn} and σ′ = {x′1/t′1,184
. . . , x′m/t
′
m} (where {x1, . . . , xn}∩{x′1, . . . , x′m} = ∅), their composition, denoted as σ ·σ′,185
is the substitution {xi/(ti · σ′)} ∪ σ′.186
The semantics of our formulae is given in terms of a model (or interpretation) S187
comprising a possibly empty and finite set of ground atomic predicates, that is, predi-188
cates without variables – all their terms/parameters are constants. We shall denote a189
ground predicate as p¯i, and we note that for any predicate pi and ground predicate p¯i′,190
we can obtain, in linear time, a substitution σ such that pi · σ = p¯i′ if the substitution191
exists; we can also find out, in linear time, if such substitution does not exist [Fitting192
1996; Martelli and Montanari 1982].193
We define below an interpretation relation I, associating a model S, a formula ϕ and194
a set of substitutions Σ = {σ1, . . . , σm} as follows:195
(1) I(S, pi, {σ}) holds iff there is a p¯i′ ∈ S such that pi ·σ = p¯i′, that is, a predicate pi holds196
in S under σ iff pi · σ = p¯i′ for some ground predicate p¯i′ ∈ S.197
(2) I(S,¬pi, {∅}) holds iff there is not one p¯i ∈ S such that pi · σ = p¯i, that is, the set of198
substitutions is just one empty substitution, as there is not one p¯i′ ∈ S s.t. pi · σ = p¯i.199
(3) I(S, (ϕ ∧ ϕ′), {σ}) holds iff I(S, ϕ, {σ}) and I(S, ϕ′, {σ}) hold.200
(4) I(S, (∃x0, . . . , xn.ϕ), {σ}) holds iff I(S, ϕ, {σ}) holds for at least one σ.201
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(5) I(S, (∀x0, . . . , xn.ϕ), {σ1, . . . , σm}) holds iff I(S, ϕ, {σi}), 1 ≤ i ≤ m, hold for every202
possible σi.203
3.2. Policies as Atomic Deontic Formulae204
We make use of first-order atomic deontic formulae [McNamara 2006; Meyer and205
Wieringa 1993; Meyer et al. 1994; von Wright 1951] in our PCD formulation; these206
are defined as follows:207
Definition 3.1. A first-order atomic deontic formulae ∆ is any construct of the form208
∃~x.2pi and ∀~x.2pi where:209
(1) ~x = x0, . . . , xn is a (possibly empty and finite) vector (sequence) of variables.210
(2) 2 ∈ {O,F,P} is one of the 3 deontic modalities O (for “obliged”), F (for “forbidden”),211
and P (for “permitted”) representing, respectively, an obligation, a prohibition, and212
a permission.213
(3) pi is a first-order predicate such that vars(pi) = {x0, . . . , xn}214
Typical examples of deontic atomic formulae are ∀x.Faccess(u1, 1, x), establishing that215
user u1 is forbidden to access one (any) record from any data collection x, and216
∃x.Oprovide(u455, 20, x), establishing that user u455 is obliged to provide 20 records to217
any one data collection x. Following the conventions of standard deontic logic [McNa-218
mara 2006; von Wright 1951], the modalities interrelate:219
— Fpi def= O¬pi, that is, a prohibition is an obligation on ¬pi220
— Ppi def= ¬O¬pi, that is, a permission is the negation of an obligation on ¬pi.221
Although we only need one deontic modality (as the other two can be formally repre-222
sented with it and the negation operator), in line with the body of work on deontic and223
normative research, we offer all three modalities, namely, permission P, prohibition224
F and obligation O, as it is easier to express and understand deontic formulae with-225
out nested negations. Quantification and modalities have been studied elsewhere (e.g.,226
[Basin et al. 2010; Castellini 2005]). We show below, when we define an operational227
semantics, how quantifications and deontic modalities come together.228
In our work we model existentially quantified obligations and permissions (∃~x.Opi229
and ∃~x.Ppi, respectively) and universally quantified prohibitions (∀~x.Fpi). These deon-230
tic formulae capture common patterns of regulated behaviour [Meneguzzi et al. 2015],231
namely, an obligation is complied with if at least one instantiation of an action (with232
specific values) is carried out; permissions are also over specific values, especially when233
permissions are interpreted as exceptions to prohibitions (as in, for instance, [S¸ensoy234
et al. 2012]). Prohibitions, on the other hand, are normally established to rule out any235
instance of an action. We notice, however, that universally quantified deontic formu-236
lae may containt constants and hence we can also represent prohibitions on specific237
actions. Finally, it is worth mentioning that there is no technical reason not to allow238
using the deontic operators with any quantification, but for simplicity, ease of presen-239
tation, and pragmatic reasons, we only consider some combinations.240
We introduce our policies via Def. 3.2; these are the “policy” part of our PCDs:241
Definition 3.2. A policy Π is of the form 〈∀~x.ϕa,∃~y.ϕd,∆〉 where:242
(1) ϕa, ϕd ∈ L are formulae of our first-order fragment and which represent activation243
and deactivation conditions, respectively;244
(2) ∆ is an atomic deontic logic formula (cf. Def. 3.1).245
We do not allow nesting of quantifiers so as to simplify the language which underpins246
our approach. However, we use our policies as rules [Buchanan and Duda 1983; Garcı´a-247
Camino et al. 2009; Meneguzzi et al. 2015], this becoming obvious in our operational248
semantics below. We allow variables appearing in ϕa to also appear in ϕd and ∆, and249
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the formalisation above is in fact a shorthand for ∀~x.((ϕa ∧ ¬(∃~y.ϕd)) → ∆), where250
→ is the standard material implication, that is, ϕ → ϕ′ if, and only if, ¬ϕ ∨ ϕ′. Such251
formulation has been adopted by various approaches to normative multi-agent systems252
(e.g., [Garcı´a-Camino et al. 2009; S¸ensoy et al. 2012; Meneguzzi et al. 2015]).253
The semantics of policies builds on the interpretation relation for our first-order254
fragment: I(S, 〈∀~x.ϕa,∃~y.ϕd,∆〉, {σ1, . . . , σm}) holds iff:255
(1) I(S, ϕa, {σi}), 1 ≤ i ≤ m, holds for every possible σi, and256
(2) I(S, ϕd · σi, {σ}), 1 ≤ i ≤ m, does not hold for any σ.257
Case 1 above establishes all instances of the activation condition/formula ϕa which258
arise from the model S. Case 2 states that we must check that none of the various259
instances of deactivation conditions ϕd · σi (one for each unification σi of the activation260
condition in the model) holds, that is, we cannot find σ in S such that I(S, ϕd · σi, {σ})261
holds. Additionally, the semantics above captures the instances of the deontic formu-262
lae: let ∆ be of the form ∃z.2pi (cf. Def. 3.1), then the semantics above provides the set263
of instances {∃z.2(pi · σi)|I(S, ϕa, {σi}), 1 ≤ i ≤ m}; a similar set of instances is defined264
for ∆ of the form ∀z.2pi.265
3.3. Policy-Carrying Data266
PCDs are formally defined as Def. 3.3: we are not specific about what the data collec-267
tions are – these can be individual records of a database, files, readings from a sensor,268
and so on. Very importantly, rather than having data collections replicated in every269
PCD referring to them, there could be only one copy of the data collection and all270
PCDs regulating its access would make use of a unique locator such as a URL.271
Definition 3.3. A policy-carrying data (collection) PCD is a pair 〈Π, D〉 where Π is272
a policy (cf. Def. 3.2) and D = {d1, . . . , dn} is a set of data items.273
We use data collection and data interchangeably; PCD stands both for “policy-carrying274
data” and “policy-carrying data collection”, although the latter can be used in the plu-275
ral (PCDs standing for “policy-carrying data collections”).276
We make use of a subset of first-order predicates to create a vocabulary of action277
labels Act which are the target of the policies. An action predicate piAct is one of the278
following (with their intuitive meaning)2:279
— access(x, y, z) – x has accessed y records of data collection z.280
— provide(x, y, z) – x has provided y records of data collection z.281
We adapt Defs. 3.1–3.3 to reflect this: our deontic formulae are represented as ∆Act282
and are of the form ∃~x.2piAct or ∀~x.2piAct; our policies, represented as ΠAct, are of283
the form 〈∀~x.ϕa,∃~y.ϕd,∆Act〉, and a PCD is of the form 〈ΠAct, D〉. When no confusion284
arises we shall omit the Act superscript for simplicity.285
A sample policy using action labels is286
〈∀x.¬access(x, 50, temp), access(x, 50, temp),Paccess(x, 50, temp)〉287
This establishes that anyone (referred to by the universally quantified variable x) is288
permitted to access 50 records of data collection temp; the norm is activated if the289
records haven’t yet been accessed, and the norm is deactivated when 50 records are290
accessed. We explain below that policies are instantiated to individuals: although the291
policy is stated in general terms, for policing/monitoring purposes (and for sanction-292
ing/rewarding when this is the case), we must keep a record of individuals’ activities293
and the policies which are applicable to them (via their roles). We explain below how294
roles are captured. The deactivation condition and deontic formula above are shown295
2We note that the action predicates can be more sophisticated, including, for instance, a description of the
kinds of records and fields of a data collection someone can access or provide.
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without quantifiers as their only variable x appears universally quantified in the acti-296
vation condition.297
Roles enable the generic reference to individuals with similar social or organisa-298
tional status, standing or credentials [Biddle 1979; Turner 2001]; role-based access299
control models [Sandhu et al. 1996; Suhendra 2011] refer to groups of users via their300
roles. Some approaches [Padget and Vasconcelos 2015; Vasconcelos et al. 2009, 2012]301
annotate the deontic modality with the role r which the policy is aimed at, as in, for in-302
stance, Orpi. However, the same effect can be achieved by adding a predicate role(x, r)303
(establishing that individual x has role r) in the activation condition of a policy, that304
is, 〈∀~x.ϕa,∃~y.ϕd,∃~z.2rpi〉 is a shorthand for 〈∀~x.(ϕ ∧ role(x, r)),∃~y.ϕd,∃~z.2pi〉 (and sim-305
ilarly for ∀~z.2rpi〉). We use a finite and non-empty set of role labels R = {r1, . . . , rt}306
and we assume a finite and non-empty set of individuals A = {a1, . . . , as} uniquely307
identified. Some roles can be associated with individuals through their membership to308
organisations (i.e., institutions or companies). We assume that individuals have their309
credentials appropriately recorded (in our states or “snapshots” as explained below) by310
those providing the data sharing setup, and these credentials are used when checking311
the applicability of policies.312
3.4. Operational Semantics313
In this section we explain the operational semantics connecting the syntax and se-314
mantics of our policies with an underlying computational model. Our underlying com-315
putational model is a sequence of states. A state is represented as the model S intro-316
duced in our interpretation relation above, and provides a “snapshot” of actual events;317
each event is recorded as a ground predicate p¯i. Similar models have been previously318
proposed (e.g., [Garcı´a-Camino et al. 2009; Fisher 2006]) and, as we show below, are319
closely related to the formal semantics of modal logics. For compactness (and to avoid320
having to check for consistency), we do not record negated predicates in our states,321
thus adopting the closed world assumption [Reiter 1978] which establishes that what322
is not stated/proven as true is deemed false.323
A sequence of states represents a history: histories record sequences of states, pro-324
viding a linear account of events and how they are temporally related. A history325
H = 〈S0, . . . ,Sn〉 is a possibly empty and finite sequence of states Sj , 0 ≤ j ≤ n. We326
formally connect policies with histories. We define below means to check if a policy327
was active in a history.328
Definition 3.4. A policy ΠAct = 〈∀~x.ϕa,∃~y.ϕd,∆Act〉 was active in history H = 〈S1,329
. . . ,Sn〉 under substitutions σa and σd if, and only if, the following conditions hold:330
(1) I(S1,∀~x.ϕa, {σa}) holds for some σa, that is, the policy became active (the activation331
condition holds) at state 1,332
(2) I(Sn,∃~y.ϕd · σa, {σd}) holds for some σd, that is, the policy became inactive (the333
deactivation condition holds) at state n, and334
(3) I(Si,∃~y.ϕd · σa,Σ), 1 < i < n, does not hold, that is, the policy was not deactivated335
in the intervening states.336
We represent policy activation as the relation active(ΠAct,H, σa, σd). We note that337
there might be many σa for one same policy and state, representing the “customi-338
sation” of a policy to a specific context.339
We establish the conditions for policy compliance with the three definitions below.340
Definition 3.5. A policy ΠAct = 〈∀~x.ϕa,∃~y.ϕd,∃~z.OpiAct〉 (an existential obligation)341
was complied with in history H = 〈S1, . . . ,Sn〉, under substitutions σa, σd, denoted as342
complyO(ΠAct,H, σa, σd), if, and only if, the following conditions hold:343
(1) active(ΠAct,H, σa, σd), that is, the policy was active in the history under σa and σd.344
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(2) I(Sj ,∃~z.(piAct · σa), {σ∆}) holds for some state Sj , 1 < j ≤ n, and σ∆, that is, there345
is a p¯iAct ∈ Sj such that p¯iAct = (piAct · σa) · σ∆.346
As an example 〈(∀x.access(x, 20, D1)), (∃yz.provide(x, y, z)), (∃yz.Oprovide(x, y, z))〉 has347
activation condition “anyone accessing 20 records of D1”; when the policy is active the348
same people who accessed the records are obliged to provide records to some data col-349
lection. The policy is deactivated when some records are provided. A history in which350
this policy is complied with is:351
H = 〈
S1︷ ︸︸ ︷
{access(bob, 20, D1)},
S2︷ ︸︸ ︷
{provide(bob, 10, D2)}〉352
The policy was active in the history (cf. Def. 3.4) as S1 fulfills the activation con-353
dition, S2 fulfills the deactivation condition and there are no intermediary states.354
Moreover, the activation condition instantiates via σa = {x/bob} the obligation355
∃yz.Oprovide(bob, y, z). S2 is also state Sj of case 2 in Def. 3.5 where the obligation356
is fulfilled, as we have p¯i = provide(bob, 10, D2) and σ∆ = {y/10, z/D2}.357
Definition 3.6. A policy ΠAct = 〈∀~x.ϕa,∃~y.ϕd,∀~z.FpiAct〉 (a universal prohibition)358
was complied with in history H = 〈S1, . . . ,Sn〉, under substitutions σa and σd, denoted359
as complyF(ΠAct,H, σa, σd), if, and only if, the following conditions hold:360
(1) active(ΠAct,H, σa, σd), that is, the policy was active in the history under σa and σd.361
(2) I(Sj ,∃~z.(piAct · σa),Σ) does not hold for any state Sj , 1 < j ≤ n, that is, there is not362
one p¯iAct ∈ Sj , 1 < j ≤ n, such that p¯iAct = (piAct · σa) · σ for any σ.363
Policy 〈(∀xyz.¬provide(x, y, z)), (∃x′y′z′.provide(x′, y′, z′)), (Faccess(x, y,D1))〉, for exam-364
ple, establishes that anyone who has not provided any records to any data collection is365
forbidden to access records from D1. The policy is deactivated when someone provides366
some records. A history in which this policy is complied with is:367
H = 〈
S1︷︸︸︷
∅ ,
S2︷ ︸︸ ︷
{provide(bob, 10, D2)}〉368
The policy was active in the history (cf. Def. 3.4) as S1 fulfills the activation condition,369
S2 fulfills the deactivation condition and there are no intermediary states. Since there370
are no states Sj in which (access(x, y,D1) · σa) · σ occurs, the policy was complied with.371
In data sharing scenarios, permissions are very important as they establish explicit372
access rights, asserting that what is not explicitly permitted (that is, there is not an373
active permission addressing a particular action) is forbidden. Moreover, permissions374
can be seen as exceptions to prohibitions and obligations, along the lines of, e.g., [Boella375
and van der Torre 2003; Governatori et al. 2013]. We provide a means to check the376
compliance of a set of permissions:377
Definition 3.7. A set of policies ΠAct = {ΠAct1 , . . . ,ΠActm },ΠActi = 〈∀~xi.ϕai ,∃~yi.ϕdi ,378
∃~zi.PpiActi 〉, 1 ≤ i ≤ m (all existential permissions), was complied with in history H =379
〈S1, . . . ,Sn〉, under a set Σ of pairs of substitutions 〈σa, σd〉, denoted as complyP(ΠAct,380
H,Σ), if, and only if, for every p¯iAct ∈ Sj , 1 < j ≤ n, the following conditions hold:381
(1) there is a ΠActk ∈ ΠAct,ΠActk = 〈∀~xk.ϕak,∃~yk.ϕdk,∃~zk.PpiActk 〉, active(ΠActk ,H′, σak , σdk),382
that is, a policy ΠActk was active in a sub-history H′ of H, under σak and σdk. H =383 H1 • H′ • H2, where “•” is the concatenation operator for sequences of states, and384
H1,H2 are possibly empty sub-histories. Moreover,H′ = H′1•〈Sj〉•H′2, (whereH′1,H′2385
are possibly empty sub-histories), that is, ΠActk was active in Sj .386
(2) p¯iAct = (piActk · σak) · σj for some σj , that is, p¯iAct is the target of ΠActk (activated with387
σak) and (possibly) further instantiated via σj .388
If, and only if, σak , and σ
d
k are as above, 〈σak , σdk〉 ∈ Σ.389
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Def. 3.7 establishes that all p¯iAct ∈ Sj (all actions recorded in any state Sj of his-390
tory H) must be unifiable with piActk · σak of a permission ΠActk which was active at391 Sj . There might be more than one such permission active, and there might be more392
than one σj for one permission and state. We illustrate Def. 3.7 with permissions393
ΠAct = {ΠAct1 ,ΠAct2 ,ΠAct3 }:394
ΠAct1 = 〈∀xz.user(x) ∧ data(z), endOfDay ,∃y.Pprovide(x, y, z)〉
ΠAct2 = 〈∀xy.provide(x, y,D1), endOfDay ,Paccess(x, y,D2)〉
ΠAct3 = 〈∀xy.provide(x, y,D1), endOfDay ,Paccess(x, y,D3)〉
395
Where endOfDay is a “flag”, recorded by the administrators of the data sharing frame-396
work to indicate the end of a period of time. ΠAct1 establishes that any user x is per-397
mitted to provide any number of records y to any data collection z. ΠAct2 establishes398
that any x who provides y records to data collection D1 is permitted to access the same399
number of records from D2. ΠAct3 is similar, but the permission is for accessing data400
from D3. A history H in which these policies are complied with is:401
〈
S1︷ ︸︸ ︷{
user(bob), user(john),
data(D1), data(D2),
data(D3)
}
,
S2︷ ︸︸ ︷{
provide(bob, 10, D1),
provide(john, 10, D1)
}
,
S3︷ ︸︸ ︷
{ access(bob, 10, D2) },
S4︷ ︸︸ ︷
{endOfDay}〉402
We have active(ΠAct1 ,H, {x/bob, z/D1}, ∅), active(ΠAct1 ,H, {x/john, z/D1}, ∅), as well as403
other cases when z unifies with D2 and D3. We also have active(ΠAct2 , 〈S2,S3,S4〉,404 {x/bob, y/10}, ∅), and active(ΠAct3 , 〈S2,S3,S4〉, {x/john, y/10}, ∅). The ground predicate405
p¯iAct ∈ S3 is the target of ΠAct2 which is active, so the set of policies is complied with.406
An interesting situation arises in this scenario3: if the compliance check had been407
defined for one policy (instead of a set of policies), then ΠAct3 , active in S3 and es-408
tablishing Paccess(john, 10,D2), would not unify with p¯iAct = access(bob, 10, D2) and a409
violation would occur. We avoid such situations with our definition as it establishes the410
compliance of permissions as a test to ensure any action performed is the target of an411
active permission. We note that we detect the violation of a set of permissions: whereas412
an obligation or a prohibition can be checked for compliance in isolation, checking the413
compliance of permissions requires all permissions to be considered together.414
A generic definition of compliance, comply(Π,H,Σ),Π = ΠO ∪ΠF ∪ΠP (obligations415
ΠO, prohibitions ΠF and permissions ΠP), holds if, and only if, the following hold:416
(1) complyO(ΠO,H,ΣO), (2) complyF(ΠF,H,ΣF), and (3) complyP(ΠP,H,ΣP); moreover,417
Σ = ΣO ∪ΣF ∪ΣP. We extend Def. 3.5 for sets: complyO(ΠO,H,ΣO),ΠO = {ΠO1 , . . . ,ΠOn},418
holds if, and only if, complyO(ΠOi ,H′[i,j], σa[i,j], σd[i,j]) for all i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, and all sub-419
histories H′[i,j], 1 ≤ j ≤ mi, of H in which ΠOi was active, active(ΠOi ,H′[i,j], σa[i,j], σd[i,j]),420
ΣO = ∪ni=1 ∪mij=1 {〈σa[i,j], σd[i,j]〉}. Def. 3.6 is extended in a similar fashion. A set of policies421
has been violated, violated(Π,H,Σ) if, and only if, comply(Π,H,Σ) does not hold, that422
is, for at least one Π ∈ Π the first condition (respectively, for obligations, prohibitions423
and permissions) of Defs. 3.5–3.7 holds and the second condition does not hold4.424
In open systems autonomous software agents are free to actually perform forbid-425
den actions, but in a data-sharing context we want to rule out any policy-violating426
3We thank an anonymous reviewer for pointing this out to us.
4We note that prohibitions and permissions can be checked for violation without a history – it is sufficient to
check that the policy was active when the violation occurred (that is, a forbidden or a non-permitted action
was carried out when the policy was active). To check the violation of an obligation, however, requires the
history during which the policy was active and expired as only then we can establish that the obliged action
was not carried out within the period of activation.
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behaviour. We thus consider an attempt to access data as evidence of policy violation:427
consumers may try to access data they are not entitled to, and this attempt counts as428
if the data had been accessed, even though our PCD will prevent this from happen-429
ing. Our policy violation above is interpreted under this light: the prohibited event is430
recorded but it did not actually happen.431
3.5. Deontic Logic and Operational Semantics432
The operational semantics provides a counterpart to the usual Kripke semantics used433
in (modal) deontic logics [McNamara 2006]. This enables us to draw parallels between434
deontic equivalences and relationships among our policies. We show that our opera-435
tional semantics preserves an important result of our quantified deontic logic:436
Claim 1. If ∃~x.Opi does not hold then ∀~x.Fpi holds:437
Proof:438
1. ¬(∃~x.Opi) holds, then (premise ∃~x.Opi does not hold, hence its negation holds)
2. ¬(∃~x.¬O¬pi) holds, then (axiom 3 of Standard Deontic Logic [McNamara 2006])
3. ¬(¬∀~x.O¬pi) holds, then (negation over quantification)
4. ∀~x.O¬pi holds, then (cancellation of double negation)
5. ∀~x.Fpi holds (by definition)
439
440
We prove below that this result also holds in our operational model. The violated441
relation in our operational model corresponds to “not holding”. Without loss of gener-442
ality, we assume that our policies have the same activation condition and deactivation443
conditions and thus are active or not in exactly the same histories. This means condi-444
tion 1 (active(Π,H, σa, σd)) of Defs. 3.5–3.7 holds, and so does active(Π,H, σa, σd) in the445
definition of violation; thus we only need to check if compliance happened (or not).446
Claim 2. If an existential obligation ΠO = 〈∀~x.ϕa,∃~y.ϕd,∃~z.Opi〉 was violated (does not447
hold) in history H = 〈S1, . . . ,Sn〉, violated(ΠO,H, σa, σd), then the universal prohibition448
ΠF = 〈∀~x.ϕa,∃~y.ϕd,∀~z.Fpi〉 was complied with (holds), comply(ΠF,H, σa, σd).449
Proof: If ΠO has been violated then complyO(ΠO,H, σa, σd) does not hold (case 2,450
Def. 3.5), that is, I(Sj ,∃~z.(pi · σa), {σ∆}) does not hold for any state Sj , 1 < j ≤ n,451
this means that there is not one p¯i ∈ Sj , 1 < j ≤ n, such that p¯i = (pi · σa) · σ∆ for any452
σ∆. This is precisely condition 2 of Def. 3.6 describing when ΠF = 〈∀~x.ϕa,∃~y.ϕd,∀~z.Fpi〉453
is complied with. 454
3.6. PCDs and Individual Agents455
PCDs are ultimately aimed at individuals, although they are specified in general456
terms. The credentials (roles) referred to in a policy are ultimately of individual agents;457
actions are performed by agents, this being captured by the first argument of predicate458
piAct. Since we only consider states with fully ground atomic predicates, we can define459
a function to provide the agent a responsible for performing p¯iAct ∈ S:460
(1) perf (access(a, n, d),S) = a, if access(a, n, d) ∈ S461
(2) perf (provide(a, n, d),S) = a, if provide(a, n, d) ∈ S462
The compliance definitions (Defs. 3.5–3.7) can be extended to obtain the iden-463
tity of individual agents responsible for complying with the policy. Given Π =464
〈∀~x.ϕa,∃~y.ϕd,∃~z.Opi〉 (an existential obligation) and a history H = 〈S1, . . . ,Sn〉 such465
that complyO(Π,H, σa, σd); we have p¯i ∈ Sj such that p¯i = (pi · σa) · σ∆, perf (p¯i,Sj) = a,466
and similarly for permissions. For prohibitions, however, the agents who complied are467
all those which did not perform a prohibited action. We denote the compliance of an468
individual a to a set of policies Π in history H as comply(Π,H, a). Since more than one469
agent may comply with the policies, we can compute them all as complyAll(Π,H, A′),470
A′ ⊆ A, such that, for all a ∈ A′, comply(Π,H, a).471
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〈
policy︷ ︸︸ ︷
〈∀xy.¬access(x, y,D1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
activation
,∃x′y′.access(x′, y′, D1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
deactivation
,∃x′′y′′.Paccess(x′′, y′′, D1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
target
〉,
data︷︸︸︷
D1 〉 (1)
〈〈∀xy.access(x, y,D1), endOfDay ,Faccess(x, y,D2)〉, D2〉 (2)
〈〈∀xy.access(x, y,D1), provide(x, 300, D2),Oprovide(x, 300, D2)〉, D2〉 (3)
Fig. 2. Sample PCDs
In realistic settings we need to consider longer histories in which a policy is com-472
plied with or violated many times. Using the operator “•” to merge/split histories,473
we say that H = H1 • H2 • · · · • Hn holds iff Hi = 〈Si1, . . . ,Simi〉, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, and474
H = 〈S11 , . . . ,S1m1 ,S21 , . . . ,S2m2 , . . . ,Sn1 , . . . ,S1mn〉. With this operator, we can compute,475
given a history, all the sub-histories in which a set of policies was complied with (or476
violated): comply∗(Π,H, {H1, . . . ,Hp}) holds iff H = H′ • Hi • H′′, comply(Π,Hi,Σ).477
A similar computation can be defined for violations: violated∗(Π,H, {H1, . . . ,Hp})478
holds if, and only if, H = H′ • Hi • H′′, violated(Π,Hi,Σ). We also define means to com-479
pute those individuals responsible for policy compliance/violation: comply∗(Π,H, {H1,480
. . . ,Hp}, {aH1 , . . . , aHp}) if, and only if, for all i, 1 ≤ i ≤ p, comply(Π,Hi, aHi). Again,481
there might be more than one agent responsible for policy compliance/violation in each482
sub-history, and we can obtain these as complyAll∗(Π,H, {H1, . . . ,Hp}, {AH1 , . . . , AHp})483
where for all i, 1 ≤ i ≤ p,AHi ⊆ A, complyAll∗(Π,Hi, AHi). With these basic operations,484
we can define policing mechanisms to dispense rewards and sanctions to individuals,485
based on histories of states and policies; we discuss one such mechanism below.486
We make use of our formalism to represent typical examples of PCD; these are shown487
in Fig. 2. PCD (1) captures a simple permission for anyone to access all records of a488
data collection. The activation condition establishes that the permission is in place if489
no records have yet been accessed, and the policy is deactivated if anyone accesses any490
records, that is, the policy stipulates a “one-off” access to the data. PCD (2) illustrates491
a useful way to inter-relate policies. It states that anyone who accesses D1 is forbidden492
to access D2. In the PCDs in Fig. 2 we omitted quantifiers whose variables are already493
quantified, i.e., x, y in the deontic formula of PCD (2), and x in the deactivation con-494
dition and in the deontic formula of PCD (3). This creates a “chain” of events relating495
PCDs: if someone makes use of the permission to access D1 (established by PCD (1))496
then it is forbidden to access D2. We also specify PCD (3), stating that those who access497
D1 are obliged to provide 300 records to (be added to) D2. The obligation is deactivated498
after the agent who accessed D1 provides some data.499
3.7. Reasoning with/about PCDs500
In [Padget and Vasconcelos 2015] we present three mechanisms to enable stakehold-501
ers to reason with and about their PCDs. Although those mechanisms were aimed at502
a simpler (propositional) language, we claim that they can be easily extended to ac-503
commodate our first-order logic. Our argument to support this claim lies in the fact504
that our states are sets of fully ground predicates, and that detection of policy compli-505
ance/violation amounts to checking if predicates occur (or not occur) in states.506
In that paper, we describe a process whereby publishers of PCDs can obtain the507
identity of individual agents who have access to data collections. The algorithm uses508
input parameters comprising a set of PCDs, a set of agents and their roles (roles asso-509
ciated to agent can be obtained via the roles function introduced earlier). The function510
returns a possibly empty set of pairs 〈D,AD〉, D being a (reference to a) data collection511
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of a PCD, and AD ⊆ A a (possibly empty) set of individual agent identities; these are512
the agents which have access to the various data collections.513
Our PCDs and their operational semantics can be used in policing. We relate permis-514
sions and prohibitions for data sharing in a pragmatic fashion. Permissions explicitly515
indicate who can access the data; if the agent is not permitted, then it will not have516
access to the data and any attempt to access the data will be recorded as a potential517
violation. According to this view, one would think that prohibitions would no longer518
be needed since anything that is not explicitly permitted is forbidden. However, prohi-519
bitions can be interpreted as permissions being revoked under special circumstances.520
In this interpretation, prohibitions take precendence over permissions, thus making521
permissions void under certain circumstances. An example would be a permission to522
access D and a prohibition to rule out its access at certain times.523
A mechanism to police data access factoring in this relation was also presented524
in [Padget and Vasconcelos 2015]. It takes as input a set of PCDs, an agent id a, the525
set R of roles, an action piAct, a target data collection D and a history H. The history526
is used as a “sliding window” from a state in the past to the current state. The mech-527
anism initially assumes access is prevented, then it carries out an analysis of existing528
PCDs: it checks if, in the set of PCDs, there is a permission on action piAct concerned529
with data D (given as a parameter) and with associated role r; it also checks if the530
permission is currently valid within a window. The mechanism then checks if the per-531
mission is applicable to agent a (via one of its roles ra); if it is, then access is granted532
(provisionally). We then check if a prohibition on action piAct over D and with associ-533
ated role r′ exists in the set of PCDs; it also checks that the policy is active within the534
relevant window. If such a PCD exists, then we check if the prohibition applies to a (via535
one of its roles ra); if it is applicable, then access is denied, and we record a’s attempt536
to perform piAct in D.537
Alternatively, we can regard permissions as exceptions to prohibitions and obli-538
gations, that is, they are strong permissions [Boella and van der Torre 2003]. We539
extend our previous definitions of policy compliance to cater for this. A prohibition540
Π = 〈∀~x.ϕa,∃~y.ϕd,∀~z.Fpi〉 was complied in H = 〈S1, . . . ,Sn〉, under σa and σd, if,541
and only if, these hold: (1) active(Π,H, σa, σd), and (2) I(Sj ,∃~z.(pi · σa),Σ) does not542
hold for any state Sj , 1 < j ≤ n. If (2) is not met, that is, there is a ground ac-543
tion p¯i ∈ Sj , 1 < j ≤ n, p¯i = (pi · σa) · σ for some σ (it unifies with the target of544
the prohibition), we check if there is an active permission allowing this: if there is a545
Πk = 〈∀~xk.ϕak,∃~yk.ϕdk,∃~zk.Ppi〉, active(Πk,H′, σak , σdk)H = H1 •H′ •H2,H′ = H′1 •〈Sj〉•H′2,546
p¯i = (pi · σak) · σ′ (pi · σak is unifiable with p¯i), then there was no violation. For those cases547
when an obligation and a permission overlap (their activation periods and targets),548
then if the obligation is deactivated while the permission was still active and the tar-549
get action was not performed, then there is no violation (the permission makes the550
obligation optional).551
4. A COMPUTATIONAL MODEL552
The computational counterpart of the formal model set out in Section 3 and specifi-553
cally the operational semantics in Section 3.4 is realised using the Institutional Action554
Language (InstAL) [Padget et al. 2016; Cliffe et al. 2005], which in turn is imple-555
mented in Answer Set Prolog (AnsProlog). The justification is twofold: (i) InstAL is a556
domain-specific language for building institutional models, such as, in this case, the557
regulations governing access to some data, and (ii) InstAL has an underpinning math-558
ematical model and a formal specification [Cliffe 2007] that connects the formal model559
to the translation of language fragments into AnsProlog, thus providing a sound formal560
foundation for the policy model.561
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We summarize the main features of InstAL here to make this article self-contained,562
but for an extended discussion, see [Padget et al. 2016]. InstAL is inspired by the so-563
cial institutions described by [North 1990] and the institutional action arena set out564
in [Ostrom 2005]. Secondly, it draws on two key notions from the literature, namely565
“counts-as” [John R. Searle 1995], which leads to the distinction between external and566
institutional events, and institutional power [Jones and Sergot 1996], which deter-567
mines whether an institutional event affects the institutional state or not, that is,568
does it really happen, depending on whether the actor has not just the permission but569
also the power to bring it about5. Thirdly, it builds on Action Languages [Gelfond and570
Lifschitz 1998], the event calculus [Kowalski and Sergot 1986] and the situation cal-571
culus [Pinto and Reiter 1995], which establish the idea of fluents – being facts that572
are true if present and false if not (i.e. closed-world assumption) – where inertial flu-573
ents persist from initiation to termination (addressing the frame problem), while non-574
inertial fluents only hold as long as the condition on which they depend is true.575
Thus, InstAL has external and institutional events, and (institutional) states com-576
prising (i) inertial fluents representing domain, permission6, power and obligation577
facts, and (ii) non-inertial fluents representing conditions over facts in given state.578
Hence, by expressing the definitions of the elements of policy-carrying data language579
in terms of InstAL, we obtain the benefits both of its formal and computational model.580
Taking each of the PCD language elements in turn:581
(1) A state S corresponds to a list of inertial and non-inertial facts as identified above,582
such as individual(i285), user(u455)583
(2) An event p¯iAct corresponds to an (external) InstAL event, such as access(Agent,584
Dataset)7, which depending on the extant permissions and any other conditions585
over the policy state at the time, may lead to the occurrence of the corresponding586
(institutional) event, such as intAccess(Agent, Dataset), or if the event is not per-587
mitted to the violation event viol(access(Agent, Dataset)).588
(3) A history H corresponds to a set of (institutional) states, typically labelled by an589
instant – usually an integer – that denotes the time at which an event was observed590
and at which time a collection of (institutional) facts hold. Instants simply provide591
an ordering and are not necessarily connected to a precise notion of the passage of592
time. The history is the computational consequence of an event trace (operations593
on the resource as interpreted in terms of the governing policy), as determined by594
the rules that initiate and terminate fluents or establish the presence or absence of595
non-inertial fluents.596
(4) A policy (Def. 3.4): corresponds to an institution definition in InstAL, which com-597
prises type declarations, event and fluent declarations, generation rules (that deter-598
mine whether external events count-as institutional events), initiation and termi-599
nation rules (that determine the consequences for the policy state) and non-inertial600
rules (that capture dynamic conditions over the policy state). We use the three ex-601
amples of Fig 2 from Section 3.6 to illustrate how PCDs can be captured in the602
InstAL framework:603
(a) A permission (definition 3.7): corresponds to InstAL’s institutional permission604
fact, written perm(action). In the case of PCD(1) in Fig.2, this is expressed as:605
606
initially perm(access(A,D1)), perm(intAccess(A,D1));607
5Just as the chair of a meeting is only one who can the start and end of business.
6InstAL offers by default a model in which all actions (events) are prohibited unless explicitly permitted,
although the converse is easily defined as demonstrated in [King et al. 2015]
7We follow the convention in logic programming that a literal starts with a lower case letter, while a variable
starts with a capital.
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intAccess(A,D1) terminates perm(intAccess(B,D1)) ...608609
where the first line expresses the permission for any agent A to access all of610
the records in resource D1, because the permission is universally quantified611
through the variable in the first position, where access is the exogenous event612
and intAccess is the corresponding institutional event. The second line indi-613
cates that the occurrence of the intAccess event terminates permission to ac-614
cess all the records in resource D1 for every agent.615
(b) A prohibition (definition 3.6): corresponds to the absence of permission to do616
something in the default InstAL behaviour. Thus, for the example in PCD (2) in617
Fig. 2, we might assume that initially all agents have permission to read from618
D1 and from D2, but if an agent access the first resource, it may not access the619
second so that for example the situation described regarding the resource D1620
and D2 can be captured as:621
622
initially perm(access(A,D1)), perm(intAccess(A,D1));623
initially perm(access(A,D2)), perm(intAccess(A,D2));624
intAccess(A,D1) terminates perm(intAccess(A,D2)) ...625626
which is very similar to the previous example in terms of the initial permissions,627
but the revocation of permission applies to A in respect of D2.628
(c) An obligation (definition 3.5): the counterpart in InstAL takes the form of an629
obligation fluent which in its full form is a triple associating a compliance ac-630
tion with a deadline event and a violation event, to indicate that the action631
must occur before the deadline or a violation occurs. InstAL also allows the632
specification of a compliant state, whose achievement satisfies the obligation, or633
a “deadline” state that triggers the violation event. In this fragment, we use a634
shorthand form of obligation in which we only specify the action that discharges635
the obligation, since there is no deadline:636
637
intAccess(A,D1) initiates obl(provide(A,D2)) ...638639
The purpose of the above is to provide an intuition for the representation of the formal640
language presented in Section 3, through a mapping of some examples to fragments of641
InstAL. We now explain the ways in which we use Answer Set Programming, continu-642
ing with the examples described in Section 3.6.643
4.1. Policies and Answer Set Programming644
Before deployment, a policy author would like to know whether the policy does what645
it is intended to do – in effect, whether it satisifies its requirements. This is a kind of646
testing, in which (for policies informally described on paper) walk-throughs with use-647
cases determine whether desired outcomes are achieved and undesired ones avoided.648
A policy specification in InstAL supports the policy author in two ways: by enabling649
policy validation off-line (using single-shot solving) and to monitor compliance on-line650
(using incremental solving)8.651
One form of validation takes specific use cases (presented as traces) that capture de-652
sired outcomes, namely the correct handling of policy-compliant behaviour and the de-653
tection of non-compliant behaviour (see examples in Section 4.2). This approach how-654
ever does only validate policy for situations that the policy-maker can anticipate. This655
may work for simple policies in isolation, where all the possibilities are clear, but loop-656
8We use the Potsdam Answer Set Solving Collection (Potassco), specifically clingo, available from http:
//potassco.sourceforge.net/, accessed 2016-09-16.
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1 institution example;
2
3 type Agent;
4 type Dataset;
5 type PCD;
6 type Role;
7
8 fluent role(Agent ,Role);
9 fluent pcd(Dataset ,PCD ,Role);
10 fluent accessed(Agent ,Dataset ,PCD ,Role);
11
12 exogenous event access(Agent ,Dataset );
13 inst event intAccess(Agent ,Dataset );
14
15 access(A,D) generates intAccess(A,D);
16
17 intAccess(A,D) initiates accessed(A,D,P,R)
18 if role(A,R), pcd(D,P,R);
19 intAccess(A,D) terminates
20 perm(access(B,D)), pow(intAccess(B,D)), perm(intAccess(B,D))
21 if role(A,R), pcd(D,P,R);
22 intAccess(A,d1) terminates
23 perm(access(A,d2)), pow(intAccess(A,d2)), perm(intAccess(A,d2))
24 if role(A,R), pcd(D,P,R);
25
26 fluent provided(Agent ,Dataset ,PCD ,Role);
27 exogenous event provide(Agent ,Dataset );
28 inst event intProvide(Agent ,Dataset );
29
30 exogenous event forever;
31 violation event never;
32 obligation fluent obl(provide(Agent ,Dataset),forever ,never );
33
34 intAccess(A,d1) initiates
35 obl(provide(A,d1),forever ,never),
36 perm(provide(A,d1)), perm(intProvide(A,d1)), pow(intProvide(A,d1))
37 if role(A,R), pcd(D,P,R);
38
39 provide(A,D) generates intProvide(A,D);
40
41 intProvide(A,D) initiates provided(A,D,P,R)
42 if role(A,R), pcd(D,P,R);
Fig. 3. The example policy specification
holes and unintended consequences can all too easily arise as the policy becomes more657
complicated or interacts with other policies (more on this in Section 6).658
A second form of validation helps the policy author address this problem: instead659
of presenting particular traces, the solver can compute all possible traces of a given660
length (i.e. a number of instants), for the events defined in the model. Without any661
constraints, that is all the permutation sequences of length n, many of which may662
make no sense in the light of domain knowledge, such as whether an event can occur663
more than once and whether one event can only occur after another (see, for example,664
[Pieters et al. 2015]). Consequently, the author can specify constraints that capture665
such domain knowledge and reduce the search space, while also specifying conditions666
in order to be presented with, say, all traces that lead to good or bad states.667
A third form of validation is compliance monitoring, where the same model as above668
is presented with one event at a time and the solver computes the next state of the669
model (hence multi-shot or incremental solving). Consequently, violations can be de-670
tected and appropriate actions taken when revising the PCD specification.671
As we noted in the previous section, a policy Π is expressed as an institutional model672
using InstAL, which we then instantiate to create a PCD 〈Π, D〉, where Π is grounded673
with respect to the dataset D and the policy provides the actions access and provide,674
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through which an individual operates on the dataset. A sequence of actions and the675
states they establish are captured as answer sets – using either single or multi-shot676
solving – which in turn encapsulate each PCD history H. In the next section, we use677
single-shot solving to explore the behaviour of some illustrative policies, as described678
in Section 3.6, against some sample traces.679
4.2. Policy validation by use case680
To demonstrate the computational model of the formalisation presented in section 3,681
the three example PCDs from Fig. 2 are combined in a single specification (Fig. 3)682
and usage scenario where Fig. 4 gives an event-oriented view of the events that683
occur and at which instants given fluents hold, while Fig. 5 gives a state-oriented684
view, showing which fluents are initiated, hold and are terminated in each state.685
intAccess(a1,d1) @example
access(a1,d1) @example
access(a1,d1) @example
viol(access(a1,d1)) @example
viol(access(a2,d1)) @example
access(a2,d1) @example
viol(access(a1,d2)) @example
access(a1,d2) @example
access(a2,d2) @example
intAccess(a2,d2) @example
intProvide(a1,d1) @example
provide(a1,d1) @example
accessed(a2,d2,pcd2,user) @example
accessed(a1,d1,pcd1,user) @example
obl(provide(a1,d1),forever,never) @example
pcd(d2,pcd2,user) @example
pcd(d1,pcd1,user) @example
perm(intProvide(a1,d1)) @example
perm(provide(a1,d1)) @example
perm(intAccess(a1,d2)) @example
perm(intAccess(a1,d1)) @example
perm(intAccess(a2,d2)) @example
perm(intAccess(a2,d1)) @example
perm(access(a1,d2)) @example
perm(access(a1,d1)) @example
perm(access(a2,d2)) @example
perm(access(a2,d1)) @example
provided(a1,d1,pcd1,user) @example
role(a2,user) @example
role(a1,user) @example
Fig. 4. The example policy event occurrence (denoted
by diamonds) and fluent duration chart (grey blocks),
time steps run left to right.
Note that for an event that occurs at686
time i, any fluents that it initiates show687
as holding from time i + 1 onward. The688
@ notation shows the name of the insti-689
tution (in this case example) that recog-690
nises the event and in which the fluents691
hold. Here there is only one institution,692
but the visualization tools account for693
models with multiple institutions.694
As described earlier, PCD(1) captures695
the permission to access all records of696
a data collection. The activation condi-697
tion specifies that the permission is in698
place if the records have not yet been699
accessed, and the policy is deactivated700
when the records are accessed (lines 19–701
21, Fig. 3); the policy stipulates a “one-702
off” access to the data, so whereas A703
is bound to the accessing agent, B is704
universally quantified with respect to705
all agents. All agents associated with706
the role of user may take advantage of707
this policy. As the trace shows (Fig. 5),708
the first access to d1 by a1 succeeds –709
logged by the presence of the fluent710
accessed(a1, d1) in the policy state his-711
tory – but subsequent attempts (both by712
a1 and a2) result in a violation, because713
all the permissions have been struck714
out after the first read (see state S0,715
where the struck through fluents iden-716
tify those that are not present in the717
next state (because they are terminated718
in this one).719
PCD(2) illustrates how to inter-relate policies (see lines 22–24, Fig.3). It states that720
anyone who accesses d1 is forbidden to access d2. The policy will never be deactivated721
once it is activated. Thus, once a1 makes use of the permission established by PCD(1)722
to access d1, its permission to access d2 is revoked (along with the permissions for any723
access d1, as per PCD(1)), but a2 can still access d2 as seen in S5 of Fig.5.724
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S0 S1 S2 S3
perm(access(a2, d2))
@example
pow(intAccess(a1, d2))
@example
pow(intAccess(a1, d1))
@example
pow(example, intAccess(a1,
d1)) @example
pcd(d1, pcd1, user) @example
pcd(d2, pcd2, user) @example
perm(intAccess(a2, d2))
@example
perm(intAccess(a1, d2))
@example
perm(intAccess(a2, d1))
@example
pow(example, intAccess(a2,
d2)) @example
role(a1, user) @example
role(a2, user) @example
perm(access(a1, d1))
@example
perm(intAccess(a1, d1))
@example
perm(access(a1, d2))
@example
pow(example, intAccess(a2,
d1)) @example
perm(access(a2, d1))
@example
pow(example, intAccess(a1,
d2)) @example
pow(intAccess(a2, d2))
@example
pow(intAccess(a2, d1))
@example
pcd(d2, pcd2, user) @example
role(a1, user) @example
role(a2, user) @example
accessed(a1, d1, pcd1, user)
@example
pow(example, intAccess(a2, d2))
@example
obl(provide(a1, d1), forever,
never) @example
perm(provide(a1, d1))
@example
perm(intProvide(a1, d1))
@example
perm(access(a2, d2)) @example
perm(intAccess(a2, d2))
@example
pcd(d1, pcd1, user) @example
pow(example, intProvide(a1,
d1)) @example
perm(provide(a1, d1)) @example
perm(intAccess(a2, d2))
@example
perm(access(a2, d2)) @example
pow(example, intAccess(a2, d2))
@example
pow(example, intProvide(a1, d1))
@example
perm(intProvide(a1, d1))
@example
accessed(a1, d1, pcd1, user)
@example
role(a1, user) @example
role(a2, user) @example
pcd(d1, pcd1, user) @example
pcd(d2, pcd2, user) @example
obl(provide(a1, d1), forever,
never) @example
role(a2, user) @example
pcd(d2, pcd2, user) @example
accessed(a1, d1, pcd1, user)
@example
pcd(d1, pcd1, user) @example
role(a1, user) @example
pow(example, intProvide(a1, d1))
@example
perm(access(a2, d2)) @example
perm(provide(a1, d1)) @example
perm(intProvide(a1, d1))
@example
pow(example, intAccess(a2, d2))
@example
perm(intAccess(a2, d2))
@example
obl(provide(a1, d1), forever,
never) @example
access(a1, d1)
intAccess(a1, d1) @example
access(a1, d1) @example
access(a1, d1)
access(a1, d1) @example
viol(access(a1, d1)) @example
access(a2, d1)
viol(access(a2, d1)) @example
access(a2, d1) @example
S3 S4 S5 S6
role(a2, user) @example
pcd(d2, pcd2, user) @example
accessed(a1, d1, pcd1, user)
@example
pcd(d1, pcd1, user) @example
role(a1, user) @example
pow(example, intProvide(a1, d1))
@example
perm(access(a2, d2)) @example
perm(provide(a1, d1)) @example
perm(intProvide(a1, d1))
@example
pow(example, intAccess(a2, d2))
@example
perm(intAccess(a2, d2))
@example
obl(provide(a1, d1), forever,
never) @example
pow(example, intProvide(a1, d1))
@example
accessed(a1, d1, pcd1, user)
@example
perm(intProvide(a1, d1))
@example
perm(access(a2, d2)) @example
perm(intAccess(a2, d2))
@example
pcd(d1, pcd1, user) @example
perm(provide(a1, d1)) @example
pow(example, intAccess(a2, d2))
@example
role(a1, user) @example
role(a2, user) @example
pcd(d2, pcd2, user) @example
obl(provide(a1, d1), forever,
never) @example
pcd(d1, pcd1, user) @example
accessed(a1, d1, pcd1, user)
@example
role(a2, user) @example
obl(provide(a1, d1), forever,
never) @example
perm(provide(a1, d1)) @example
pow(example, intProvide(a1, d1))
@example
perm(intProvide(a1, d1))
@example
accessed(a2, d2, pcd2, user)
@example
role(a1, user) @example
pcd(d2, pcd2, user) @example
provided(a1, d1, pcd1, user)
@example
pcd(d2, pcd2, user) @example
role(a2, user) @example
role(a1, user) @example
accessed(a2, d2, pcd2, user)
@example
perm(intProvide(a1, d1))
@example
pcd(d1, pcd1, user) @example
pow(example, intProvide(a1, d1))
@example
perm(provide(a1, d1)) @example
accessed(a1, d1, pcd1, user)
@example
access(a1, d2)
viol(access(a1, d2)) @example
access(a1, d2) @example
access(a2, d2)
access(a2, d2) @example
intAccess(a2, d2) @example
provide(a1, d1)
intProvide(a1, d1) @example
provide(a1, d1) @example
Fig. 5. The example policy trace: states 0–6
Finally, PCD(3) states that an agent that accesses d1 is obliged to provide records725
(to be added) to d2. The obligation is initiated in state S1 and is deactivated after the726
agent who accessed d1 provides some data in state S6 (thus it is struck out in S5 to727
highlight that it is not present in S6).728
We illustrate above how to validate a policy against given traces that lead to known729
outcomes. The same model can also be used to validate normative properties of a policy730
by checking for the (non-)existence of traces that lead to (un)desirable outcomes, by731
expressing as conditions over events and states, as described in [Hopton et al. 2009].732
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The details for the scenario set out above are omitted here for lack of space, but the733
application of the principle can be seen in [Pieters et al. 2015].734
5. RELATED WORK735
At the macro-level, we are inspired by Berners-Lee’s [Berners-Lee 1999] vision of the736
semantic web as a collection of connected resources that, remarkably for a text about737
future developments in computing, remains relevant nearly two decades later. More738
recently, Berners-Lee has called for a bill of rights or magna carta [Kiss 2014] to ad-739
dress issues of privacy, censorship and control of the internet. That is an on-going and740
evolving debate in the febrile political environment of early 2017, stimulated by the741
cases of Manning, Snowden and the Democratic National Committee (in the USA),742
amongst others and the Draft Communications Data Bill (in the UK) which was even-743
tually enacted as the Investigatory Powers Bill [Investigatory Powers Bill 2016]. The744
proposal here seeks to provide a formalism, associated mechanisms and a computa-745
tional framework to capture specific features that reflect the principles capturing the746
notions of privacy preferences and policies as described in [Berners-Lee 1999], but tak-747
ing into account the broader context that is being created by IoT and STS in the years748
since.749
Research on security and privacy explored alternatives for authentication and au-750
thorisation, including the popular role-based access control (RBAC) models [Sandhu751
et al. 1996; Suhendra 2011], building on role theory [Biddle 1979; Turner 2001]. These752
assume, however, that the principal can only act on the subject in a context where the753
principal’s actions can be observed and controlled. This clearly does not hold in an en-754
vironment in which data is shared and propagated largely without oversight, although755
[Cheng et al. 2012; Karjoth et al. 2003] begin to address this scenario. Nevertheless,756
once the data is outside the domain in which the policy can be enforced, the guarantees757
that a security framework such as RBAC provides almost certainly cannot be upheld758
and encryption probably only delays access. Thus, expectations about the treatment of759
data must be revised to accept transparency in place of privacy, although this too can-760
not necessarily be assured. Some of the practicalities arising from this are discussed761
in [Sackmann and Ka¨hmer 2008]. Hansen [2012] sets out higher level requirements:762
“unlinkability when possible and desired, transparency on possible and actual link-763
ages, and the feasibility for data subjects to exercise control or at least intervene in764
the processing of data.” We notice “where possible”: there cannot be absolute guaran-765
tees, only best efforts.766
Others have independently used the term “policy-carrying data”. The research pre-767
sented in [Wang et al. 2013] and [Saroiu et al. 2015] introduces concepts by the same768
name, but their focus is on encryption aspects, architecture and information models,769
and how their approaches can be implemented/integrated with specific technologies.770
There is very little detail about the policy languages they might support and no dis-771
cussion of their semantics, formalisation or the scope for reasoning about policy as a772
normative framework, as described here. As mentioned before, we build upon, expand773
and adapt our work presented in [Padget and Vasconcelos 2015], in which a much sim-774
pler formalisation in propositional logic was presented. Our present research offers a775
first-order logic formalism, with practical concerns – our language is not as expressive776
as full first-order logic, but the associated mechanisms are decidable.777
Our work draws upon research on normative multi-agent systems [Andrighetto et al.778
2013], especially on proposals for norm specification [Savarimuthu et al. 2013; S¸ensoy779
et al. 2012; Vasconcelos et al. 2009] and normative (practical) reasoning [Balke et al.780
2013; Garcı´a-Camino et al. 2009; Meneguzzi et al. 2015]. Our notation is heavily in-781
spired by existing work [Garcı´a-Camino et al. 2009; S¸ensoy et al. 2012; Vasconcelos782
et al. 2009] but we simplify the components of our policies, leaving out aspects such as783
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deadlines and sanctions/rewards. A rule-based language such as [Garcı´a-Camino et al.784
2009], being Turing-complete, would allows us to represent arbitrary concepts, but its785
expressiveness would render reasoning mechanisms more complex. We note that our786
semantics – the explicit recording of states of the computation – has been used in the787
literature, either as Kripke structures (providing the usual underpinning of modal de-788
ontic logics [McNamara 2006]) or as operational semantics [Garcı´a-Camino et al. 2009;789
Vasconcelos et al. 2012].790
We also report on [Karjoth et al. 2003], which describes a platform to enforce indi-791
vidual enterprise privacy “promises” across multiple enterprises. The work presents792
useful practical examples of obligations, such as “we delete collected data if consent793
is not given within 15 days”, and 4 stakeholders/roles are identified, namely (i) data794
subject, (ii) data users, (iii) privacy officer, and (iv) security officer. A mapping trans-795
lates application-independent obligations into available actions, so there is an abstract796
(institution-like) layer, but this is not recognised explicitly as a concept. A useful contri-797
bution is the notion of “sticky policies” associated with data in the same way as meta-798
data. Their formalisation adopts the Authorization Specification Language of [Jajodia799
et al. 2001].800
6. CONCLUSIONS, DISCUSSION AND FUTURE WORK801
This paper draws upon the extensive body of research on normative (multi-agent) sys-802
tems to propose a formal framework based on Deontic first-order logic to represent803
and reason with/about data access policies. The application of principles from norma-804
tive systems gives rise to a language that can be seen as “sufficiently rich” – in that805
it is known to be adequate to capture norms – as well as one that is “agent-oriented”,806
making the approach suitable for complex socio-technical systems.807
The main idea is that a policy conceptually encapsulates a data resource, to give808
the notion of policy-carrying data (PCD). This does not imply physical encapsulation,809
since that would then preclude making a single resource subject to multiple policies810
(e.g. depending on the role of the accessor or other factors). Furthermore, we assume811
and do not address data en/decryption, but observe that the combination of policy and812
(encrypted) data offers a kind of quasi-homomorphic encryption (the policy enforces813
the operations that can be carried out), in contrast to full homomorphic encryption814
(the form of the encryption is what ensures only permitted operations work).815
Some elements of future work are quite straightforward and follow from recent work816
on connected and interacting institutions [Padget et al. 2016], and on hierarchical in-817
stitutions [King et al. 2015]. The examples presented in sections 3.6 and 4.2 show a818
policy that associates access to one dataset with access to another. This illustrates how819
a single policy might be used to control access to two resources. In contrast, an impor-820
tant aspect to address in future work is policy interaction, where actions taken in the821
context of one policy have an effect in one or more others, such as expanding or limit-822
ing an actor’s range of permitted actions or incurring obligations. Provision for policy823
interaction is a practical necessity, because one policy for everything has no sense and824
because it is both desirable and inevitable that policies will be developed and revised825
independently and incrementally.826
We must also draw attention to some limitations in our proposal. In particular, we827
acknowledge there are situations for which our formalism is not adequate or simply828
not expressive enough. For instance, for situations in which policies are addressed to829
groups of users, as studied in, e.g. [Aldewereld et al. 2016], our formalism and its (op-830
erational) semantics may be awkward. More concretely, if we need to represent, say,831
an obligation on m individuals to provide as a group n records (that is, the obligation832
is fulfilled if one or more individuals in the group provide n records, and not m × n833
records), we will need to create m obligations – one for each individual – and their de-834
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activation conditions would be if anyone (possibly more than one individual) provides835
n records. We also note that more subtle normative aspects, e.g., differentiating per-836
missions and rights – where a right (of someone) implies in an obligation for someone837
else – would require “chains” of policies whose violation/compliance may prove hard to838
detect.839
We would like to extend our formalism to represent rewards/sanctions when poli-840
cies are complied with or violated. These rewards/sanctions add a game-theoretic as-841
pect through utilities, which should be factored in when stakeholders design and rea-842
son with/about policies. This is currently being investigated within a peer-to-peer sce-843
nario [Cauvin et al. 2016]. Additionally, we are aware that active policies can be useful844
when establishing the context (activation and deactivation conditions) of other poli-845
cies, as explored in, for instance [Garcı´a-Camino et al. 2009]. We will explore means to846
extend our formalism to enable us to represent active policies as part of the activation847
and deactivation conditions.848
An important issue that we have not addressed in this presentation is the technical849
means to ensure that actions and events are reliably logged for auditing or use in post-850
mortem analyses. Basin et al. [2013] among others point out various problems with851
incomplete and disagreeing logs and provide means to handle these in a centralised852
fashion. Although we introduced our approach using a centralised model in Section 2853
and assumed we have access to complete (ever-growing) histories of events, these are854
not realistic, failing to scale up and creating bottlenecks and single-points of failure.855
Alternative distributed approaches such as the one reported in, for instance, [Vascon-856
celos et al. 2012], could be adapted/extended for our purposes. Additionally, properties857
of various experimental forms of distributed ledger – those focussing on data and con-858
tracts, rather than value transfer like Blockchain [Underwood 2016] – appear promis-859
ing and are being investigated [Cauvin et al. 2016], so that participants hold encrypted860
copies of relevant events and histories thus bypassing central servers/repositories.861
Finally, although the computational representation of our policies are declarative,862
authoring such specifications requires experience and specialist knowledge. We are863
therefore exploring the possibility of using controlled natural language to write regu-864
lations, inspired by narrative theory [Thompson et al. 2015].865
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